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An Essay on the Relative Importance of, and Interaction between, "Ideology" and "Power" in Contemporary World Politics

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THE CLOAK AND THE DAGGER

An Essay on the Relative Importance of, and Interaction between, "Ideology" and "Power" in Contemporary World Politics

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MASTER'S ESSAY

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I. Introduction

A. Global Scenario

World politics are marked by a restless universal unwillingness to tolerate the notion of political normality as vast military confrontations and their concomitant chaotic conditions mar the international scene. The disorderly nature and frequent near paralysis of world politics, epitomized by the absence of a meaningful dialogue in Vietnam as this is being written, has increased tensions to unprecedented heights.

While the two dominant powers, armed with thermonuclear missiles and divided by competing ideologies, are continually struggling for a world in which their respective values can prevail, another struggle, between former colonial powers and the culture they represent on the one hand and the vanguards of colonial emancipation on the other, has enlarged the scope and intensity of the world conflict. Communist China has been much more than an eager witness to the contest. The emergence of a Chinese nuclear capability presents the dilemma of a future nuclear confrontation in Asia as well as in Europe. This, in brief, is the setting of contemporary world politics. No nation today is immune from the danger of nuclear devastation or secure from political and ideological penetration.

B. Prospectus

This essay is planned around two entangled concepts of contemporary world politics--ideology and power. Attention is focused on both the actions (foreign policy) and interactions (international politics) of selected nation-states, discussed both individually and collectively. Power and ideology are treated as forces which cut across and operate within these units. This level has been chosen as the primary level of analysis because ideologies enter into the political process through state governmental organizations, and states normally monopolize the legitimate use of power within the established geographic limits of their respective jurisdictions.

The first section of this paper is devoted to capsuled descriptions of the phenomena generally associated with the terms "ideology" and "power." Such inquisitorial investigation of these illusive concepts appears imperative before attempting to link them subsequently with their political environment. Next, three macro models are constructed as "ideal types" for purposes of comparison and making generalizations about possible relations among polity, power, and ideology in diverse societies. These models stress the domestic functions of ideology, and the ideological motivations underlying the pursuit of power. Then, departing from the abstract realm, we apply our "ideal type" conceptualizations in determining how significant states utilize power and ideology in international relations. Our primary interest lies in the degrees to which ideology and power affect the formulation of a state's foreign policy and the resulting implications for international politics. And ultimately, a summation is made and conclusions drawn about the hypotheses that have been posited throughout the essay.

This broadly eclectic approach is predicated on three basic assumptions:

1. The roles of ideology and power in international politics cannot be understood without comprehending also their roles in the domestic and foreign policies of states.
2. Understanding these latter roles and how they interact requires, as a minimum, an understanding of the relevant social and political environment of states.
3. The relative importance of, and interaction between, ideology and power varies from society to society according to the stage of modernization and the political formulae current therein and their compatibility therewith.

Both the dominant ideology of a society and the power available to a society determine, and are determined by, its political formulae. Therefore power and ideology should be analyzed by a scheme identifying the relevant political actors, the political arena, the orientations and ideologies of the actors, and the relationship of all these to the underlying system which defines the politics of the society.

II. The Nature of Ideology and Power

A. The Cloak

> Only in a world in upheaval, in which fundamental new values are being created and old ones destroyed, can intellectual conflict go so far that antagonists will seek to annihilate not merely the specific beliefs and attitudes of one another, but also the intellectual foundations upon which these beliefs and attitudes rest.[1]

To understand "ideologies"--what they are, what gives rise to them, and how they function--we will explore in this section their significant features as laid down by social theorists who have had something pertinent to say about them.

What Are Ideologies?

An ideology may be simply defined as a more or less logically coordinated set of beliefs, doctrines, and appeals advanced by a political actor and oriented about some of the problems of the nation-state. The negative components within all ideologies are usually concerned with the elimination of certain iniquities of society, while on the positive side is the perhaps utopian dream of establishing the good humane type of society once evil has been eliminated.

What Gives Rise to Them?

Karl Mannheim traced in Ideology and Utopia the historical process by which the concept of ideology evolved as a segment of the very subject matter to which it referred. Mannheim's asseveration that

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[1]Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936), p. 64.

"the significant element in the conception of ideology . . . is the discovery that political thought is integrally bound up with social life"[2] makes explicit the thesis in his sociology of knowledge. This is also the official line of Karl Marx, who is generally credited with giving the greatest impetus to ideology as a means of translating ideas into action, principally through the criticism of extant society. The great ambition of Marx was to "rid the present of the past."[3]

Because ideologies may often be used for the maintenance and protection of the systems of political power which they eulogize, Mannheim stressed their conservative traits.[4] To him, ideologies presupposed false consciousness and when espoused were already being bypassed by history. Juxtaposed to this view is his conception of the utopian mentality of the radical who ignores what exists to posit something that "is not and never will be." The utopian consciousness is right in its general direction of change, but wrong in predicting what will be brought about.[5] "Mannheimian ideologies" therefore are posited to protect the power of declining groups; "utopias" are located in the ideals of the rising classes.

Another popular approach, somewhat divergent from the Marx-Mannheim "social class" idea, stresses societal stages of intellectual growth or modernization, ideological fervor being characteristic of the early phases of the process. Max Weber followed this second approach in positing

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[2]Ibid., p. 125.

[3]Cf. Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), p. 370.

[4]Mannheim, op. cit., p. 40.

[5]Ibid., p. 192.

his three types of authority--traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal.[6] Other writers such as Erich Fromm[7] and Daniel Bell[8] argue that as industrial societies become increasingly diversified, complex, and affluent, ideological rigidity is undermined, and ideological claims become more and more difficult to justify by the elite.[9] Such arguments are frequently made with regard to the Soviet Union and also to explain "the end of ideology" in Western nations.

The predominant approaches in explaining the social determinants of political ideologies are the "strain theory" and the "interest theory" which may often overlap as men try to escape anxiety while pursuing personal advantage.[10] According to the strain theory, when persons are dissatisfied with their social arrangements, frustrations begin to build; but instead of directing their anger toward the source of their discontent, their aggressiveness is rechanneled--a sublimation if you will--into a more acceptable form of fierce devotion to an ideology. The strain theory may account for the rise of Naziism after World War I and for the support of French and Italian Communist Parties today.

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[6]Cf. Leonard Binder, "Ideological Foundations of Egyptian-Arab Nationalism" in David Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (London: Collier-Macmillan, Ltd., 1964), pp. 150-51, for inadequacy of both these approaches in explaining nineteenth century European nationalism.

[7]Erich Fromm, May Man Prevail? An Inquiry into the Facts and Fictions of Foreign Policy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1964), pp. 67-85.

[8]Bell, op. cit., pp. 374-75.

[9]Cf. K. H. Silvert, Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 441. "In complex developed and mature societies the push toward high orders of complexity and international interdependence contributes to changing loyalty identification."

[10]Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System" in Apter, op. cit., pp. 52-57.

In the interest theory, men are driven to their actions primarily by a desire for power, but conceal this crass "id" desire in the "superego" terminology of ideology, which serves, not only as a salve to the conscience of the proponents of an ideology, but as an attractive device to ensnare others.[11] Thus, ideology has the effect of legitimizing, extending, and building the power of the system. Stalinist totalitarianism epitomized "interest theory" ideology.

A Functional Approach

Three broad meanings of "ideology" are outlined below in an attempt to ascribe function to the term in the functionally integrated social system.[12] These areas of functional specificity are designated as value structure, tension-managing device, and an instrument to conceal reality.

(1) Ideology as Value Structure

Although the term "ideology" usually has a pejorative meaning in the prevalent American usage, many contemporary authors have been using it in a more generous light to denote simply a "system of ideas,"[13] "a value

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[11]Cf. Hans J. Morgenthau, "Power and Ideology in International Politics" in James Rosenau, International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 173. "It is the very nature of politics to compel the actor on the political scene to use ideologies in order to disguise the immediate goal of his action. The immediate goal of political action is power."

[12]Cf. Apter, op. cit., Introduction, p. 18: ". . . ideology helps to perform two main functions: one directly social, binding the community together, and the other individual, organizing the role personalities of the maturing individual. These functions combine to legitimatize authority."

[13]Fromm, op. cit., p. 121.

system,"[14] or "a set of values and attitudes oriented about the problems of the state."[15] Raymond Aron has said that "in the twentieth century, a great power weakens itself if it refuses to serve an idea."[16] Viewed in this neutral light concerning its reality content, ideology functions as a value structure, a source of norms "to organize the role personalities of maturing individuals";[17] to justify the societal division of labor; and to condition the style of leadership. In a sense this usage blurs the distinction between ideology and morality. Ideology, thus used, also enables us to see more clearly how it legitimizes the use of power, transforming it into authority and, thereby, revealing the political significance of power. Hence we are able to speak of an American ideology or, possibly, to undertake more fruitful analysis of the current Soviet ideology.

Also of importance is the role of ideology as value structure in determining "human will." Will may be manifested as determination, resolve, fear, or indifference, but in any event it is crucial to the use of power in accomplishing national objectives. Will depends on the particular objectives and values of the state in question; ideology may, of course,

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[14]Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, the Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1960), pp. 389-417.

[15]Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Random House, 1957), p. 90.

[16]Raymond Aron, "Quest for a Philosophy" in Stanley Hoffman (ed.), Contemporary Theory in International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 91.

[17]Apter, loc. cit.

establish both values and objectives.[18] In this respect ideology may stiffen American resolve to overcome the psychological fact of "cold-war battle fatigue."

(2) Ideology as Tension-Managing Device

The use of ideology as a tension-managing device is probably the closest of the three functions to the Marx-Mannheim usage. Status ambitious or threatened groups, often in an incipiently dysfunctional society, experience psychological tension as explained in the strain theory above. This social and psychological role of ideology, as distinct from its social determinants, reveals ways of dealing with the disturbances that cause the "strains." Ideology functions to bridge the gap between the prevailing limits of reason and the psychological needs of man within society, and as a safety-valve to release emotional tension onto symbolic enemies such as "The Bourgeoisie" or "The Jews." Such symbols may be used as social cement to knit a class or group together. Erich Fromm refers to the dynamic concept of ideology "to articulate the deepest longings of man,"[19] dispelling strains by bringing them into the public notice to make continued neglect more difficult. And finally, Eric Hoffer speaks of ideologies that "ripen a person for self-sacrifice" by stripping him of "his individual identity and distinctness" through his complete assimilation into a collective body.[20] Thus, on a usually unconscious level, the individual

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[18]Richard C. Bowman, "National Policy in the War of Wills," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 91, No. 4, Whole No. 746, April 1965, p. 47.

[19]Fromm, op. cit., p. 122.

[20]Eric Hoffer, The True Believer, Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movement (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), p. 60.

balances his otherwise continual state of anxiety by the acceptance of an ideology--even though the ideology itself might bring chaos.

(3) Ideology as an Instrument to Cloak Reality

Mannheim, in dealing with man's efforts to use or distort ideologies for political ends, distinguished between the "particular" conception of ideology (the cloak) denoting skepticism "of the ideas and representations advanced by our opponent . . . the more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation," and the "total" conception referring to the ideology of a "concrete historico-social group."[21] The essence of an ideology is that its propositions are advanced by an advocate and therefore may easily be transformed into propaganda; for this reason ideology has become a pejorative term.

Talcott Parsons observes that evaluative processes are responsible for "selectivity" (an unbalanced account of available truth) and often "outright distortion," both in stating the case of the proponents and in attacking that of the opponents.[22] "It is typical that the former are pictured as motivated by the highest of idealistic motives, while the latter are guided by the grossest form of self-interest."[23]

From Ideas to Social Levers

Eric Hoffer has argued that contemporary times are the age of the "true believer," where "mass man" is in the center of the political process

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[21] Mannheim, op. cit., p. 56.

[22] Talcott Parsons, "Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process" in Harry Eckstein (ed.), Internal War (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 66.

[23] Ibid.

and his ideological manner of thinking has become an integral part of the international system.[24] To influence a mass audience, an ideology must be identifiable by the people and, therefore, must "simplify ideas, establish a claim to truth, and, in the union of the two, demand a commitment to action."[25] Only then is it competent to arouse the passions in people and thereby channelize emotional energy into political power where it becomes especially relevant to this discussion.

Summary

An ideology may be a sincere belief and/or a tool for political gain; it may serve psychological as well as political needs; and it may stabilize, unite, or divide. From this general analysis one might expect a predominantly ideological approach to the conduct of international relations to be deterministic and doctrinaire, to contain moral overtones and emotional commitment, and to be antagonistic to compromise and harmony. Rigid monocarpic ideologies do not long endure the ravishes of time. World politics necessitate that an ideology also remain faithful to the policy-makers, who, through reasonable dialogue instead of continual crisis bargaining with states of opposing belief systems, will transform an ideology to meet new demands imposed by a constantly changing world society. Policy cannot long consist of ideological rhetoric that refuses the indispensable, patient, and tiresome negotiations which are the only efficacious means to peace and normality.

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[24] Hoffer, op. cit., passim.

[25] Bell, op. cit., p. 377. Cf. Hoffer, op. cit., p. 18. "So, too, an effective doctrine: as well as being a source of power, it must also claim to be a key to the book of the future."

B. The Dagger

Power is one of the key concepts involved in all political phenomena and especially in contemporary world politics. However, it is also an analytical concept on which there is a notable lack of consensus, both about its specific definition, and about many features of the context in which it should be placed, such as the "balance of power." There is apparent agreement that the core of its meaning involves the capacity "to get something done." As used herein power is the capacity to control in one's interest the behavior or decisions of others, including especially the capacity to affect adversely their interests.

The Ptolemaic View

> International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.[26]

Hans Morgenthau's "realist" theory of international politics, based on the thesis that "power politics" is synonymous with politics, is one of the prevailing approaches to an understanding of international relations. The concept of interest defined in terms of power provides power with paramount significance in drafting foreign policy.

"Power politics" is generally considered as implying that the foremost goal of each state is the maximization of power with minimum or no regard for legal and moral obligations. The most basic common objective is preservation and improvement of the state's power position in relation to other states. Morgenthau concedes, however, that moral restraints do

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[26]Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, the Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1960), p. 27.

operate upon the use of national power.[27] Such a point of departure gives perfunctory attention to the role of ideology in world politics, restricting it to the masking of power motives.

Political behavior in contemporary world politics is not shaped merely by power struggle as in the narrow, traditional connotation of power politics,[28] though force remains "the final arbitre of rivalries among nations," and, certainly, power considerations are of primary importance in the formulation of foreign policy.

The Acquisition and Use of Power

National power is the major criterion used in measuring the nature and extent of a state's capacity to achieve the goals deemed advantageous to itself. National aspirations can be achieved only to the extent that they are reinforced by power--military, economic, intellectual, and moral.

The constituent elements of a nation's power may be viewed as a combination of its tangible and intangible resources. The physical resources should include as a minimum a country's population, manpower, military establishment, industrial productivity, agricultural means, geographic size and location, and natural resource endowments. Add to these such psychological factors as its international strategic situation, national morale, level of education and technology, and social, economic,

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[27] Ibid., p. 234.

[28] Cf. Ernst Haas, "The Balance of Power as a Guide to Policy-Making," The Journal of Politics, XV (August, 1953), 397-98. "A democratic society recognizes the validity of a variety of motivations. . . . The power motivation is obscured; its demands must constantly be compromised with the requirements of other motivations, equally valid in a democracy; and when these other motivations happen to contradict the demands of power, the balance of power does not and cannot act as a guide to policy-making."

and political structure. Resources of dependable alliance partners might also be included. Availability, convertibility, and potential growth must be considered in relation to each of these physical and metaphysical qualities. Moreover, most of these assets are not subject to direct measurement, but must be evaluated.

The structuralist view of resources being manipulated by various power factions stresses rigidity and necessity and the hierarchical aspects of power systems, rather than the freedom of power. These resources are important only in situations where they can be utilized effectively; in this sense power must be deployable. The advent of thermonuclear weapons has emphasized the importance of immediately available power as opposed to potential power.

Power may also be used as dominion--a relationship of inequality among states where power is exercised through direct political control of subject peoples, irrespective of motives. The Soviet Union still seeks to play that role in parts of eastern Europe--but its dominance over its satellites is inevitably weakening.

Power must be measured not only by the possession of strength in resources, but by the utilization of that strength. The empirical evidence of power used as an instrument to produce an intended effect is the accomplishment of the objective in question. This instrumentalist view is of power as being flexible and goal-oriented, of political leaders exercising power by applying their values and ideologies to the processes of policy-making in the achievement of other values, which might otherwise not be obtained.

If the intention of the political actor who threatens or actually uses the power is made the central criterion for analysis, the primary instrumental uses of power may be described as deterrence from unacceptable acts and punitive measures for acts actually committed. Of these instrumental uses of power the most important, the most efficient, and by far the most frequently used is power as deterrent. The deterrent effect is relative to the amount of power being held in check and also to the incentives to action or aggression residing behind that power. Its true value can be measured only by the response of those against whom such power is directed--are they cognizant of such deterrent power, and has their reaction to it been the desired one? Ultimately, the United States deterrent power over the Soviet Union and China depends on holding their cities as "hostages," and of course they are aware of this. Deterrence then is bargaining power--a psychological and political posture.

Power restraints may be imposed (a) by the nature of the situation. (For instance, only if military force is commensurate with the provocation will successful deterrence be accomplished. Therefore, force must be regulated, and the military must accept restraints.) Or, (b) restraints may spring from the internal value system or ideology of the states involved in the power relationship.[29] A nation's unique constitutional processes also limit its power by determining the resources placed at the disposal of the foreign policy-maker. Although the United States has often been called "the arsenal of democracy," its power is subject to numerous restraints,

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[29]Cf. Paul Nitze, "Necessary and Sufficient Elements of a General Theory of International Relations" in William T. R. Fox (ed.), Theoretical Aspects of International Relations (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 12.

such as the liberal culture stressing the moral aspects of power, the necessary considerations of numerous allies, and world opinion.

The Quest for Power

In their quest for power, nations may be classified, according to their purposes, into three groups corresponding to money-seekers in a market economy.[30] The first group, the bereft, must endure great sacrifice merely to attain enough power to satisfy their most urgent national needs. This grouping includes the vast majority of underdeveloped nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America today. A second group, the affluent, are skillful and/or fortunate enough to have sufficient power to achieve their specific goals and still maintain a "nest egg" of additional power not immediately needed in the furtherance of national objectives. This group is most likely to contain the status quo powers, the United States, most of Western Europe, Japan, and members of the British Commonwealth. The final group, the misers, develop an insatiable lust for power because it has become a value in itself; a pathological urge pushes the nation to enormous exertions and exorbitant demands on others. Best fitted to this category appear to be the Communist states, in particular the Soviet Union and China; the latter is not included in the bereft nations grouping, simply because of its enormous potential, and its "power for power's sake" predilection.

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[30] Cf. Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 106. "The quest for influence or power is as universal in the international arena as is the quest for money in a market economy."

C. Closing the Circle

In summary, ideology interacts with power in several significant ways. It may legitimize and structure the use of power, strengthen (or enervate) will power, increase or decrease prestige, and conceal the true motives of those struggling for power. It may, on the one hand, be used as a basis for the national interest in the positive sense, imparting to it meaning, purpose, and direction. Or, on the other hand, ideology may be used as a rationalization for the use of power in the negative sense. In either case it provides a measure of cohesive rationale for internal order as well as for external action. It is the apparent relationship between ideology, power, and national interest that is most interesting to international relations and most appropriate to this discussion.

III. Setting the Stage

This essay develops a theoretical framework to show relationships between ideology and power in world politics. The "ideal types" drawn endeavor to encompass three principal groups of national actors on the world stage. No particular effort has been made to fit everything that comes along; it is believed, however, that the process of selection is such that the clusters do not distort the picture.

The implicit assumption here is that global society, though composed of numerous disparate societies or nations, may be viewed for purposes of analyzing ideology and power by comparing clusters of nations that have certain features in common. The "pie has been cut" according to what we are attempting to analyze: the relative importance of ideology and power.

A. The Liberal Democratic Model

The first theoretical construct is a macro model of a functionally integrated social system prevalent in a modern mass-industrialized liberal democracy. This pluralist society exhibits, using S. E. Finer's terminology, a "mature political culture" because there is a strong and widespread consensus covering the constitution and legitimacy of the sovereign authority and a corresponding belief that no other center of power is legitimate.[31] It extends also to approval of the procedures for transferring this power. The government is sustained by strong sentiments; well disciplined social groups

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[31] S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback, the Role of the Military in Politics (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), p. 88.

and firmly established civil procedures and institutions enable it to weather adversity and pursue consistent policies. Domestic policy is determined by persuasion and compromise as opposed to force and coercion.

Foreign policy is influenced by the existing or predicted will of the people. Governmental leaders, who actually determine policy, must stand for competitive election and, as a result, tend to share common values with the people.

The status of the constitutional foundation of the governing authority is legitimized by the belief system of the society--ideology functioning primarily as value structure. This ideology is liberalism. Generalizing about its content as it appears today may be a hazardous endeavor. Liberalism in a given country is conditioned by the character of its prevailing form of government. There is probably no condensed version of liberal principles--a "liberal catechism"--as such; however, as a fairly consistent philosophy, liberalism has become synonymous with personal fulfillment, self-expression, moral dignity, progress through reason, and democracy practiced through guaranteed rights and popular participation; it opposes forms of authority considered restrictive of individual freedom and social progress, such as censorship barriers limiting free expression of opinion. Individualism is its basic tenet and its ultimate objective is the maximum satisfaction of the individual's needs and aspirations.

Power is not very attractive to the liberal. According to Samuel Huntington, "liberalism normally either denies the existence of power, minimizes its importance, or castigates it as inherently evil."[32] The liberal, while he may respect a great amalgamation of power, seeks to

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[32]Huntington, op. cit., p. 90.

impose restraints on power and prefers that national security and peace be attained through legalistic and moral devices, such as international organizations. The "power games" of states are viewed through the liberal's ideological lenses as being useless in solving the world's major problems and as inhuman interference with the lives of ordinary people. The humanitarian pacifist current in liberal thought is strong; but the liberal will normally support wars waged on behalf of liberal ideals. Robert Osgood states that power in a liberal democracy, if it is to protect national interests and extend its values to others, must serve three functions: "deter[ring] aggression; if deterrence fails, it must defeat aggression by means sufficiently limited to serve political ends; and it must support national policy by means short of war."[33]

Liberal democracies today have fortunately attained sufficient deterrent power to satisfy such vital goals as preserving their freedom and prosperity, and they still maintain a reserve for future contingencies.[34] However, even the strongest of states may no longer have the power available to manage events beyond their borders.

B. The Communist State Model

There are definite limits to the clarification to be derived from generalizations about the Communist world and the roles of ideology and power within it. It is obvious that the once monolithic Communist bloc is

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[33] Robert Osgood, "The Uses of Military Power in the Cold War" in Robert A. Goldwin (ed.), America Armed, Essays on United States Military Policy (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1963), pp. 1-2.

[34] There is obviously a tremendous national power differential between the United States and the other nations subsumed under this model.

in political disarray and that Communism has diverse meanings and functions in its several environmental encampments. These settings may be divided according to the origins of the Communist states into (1) the Soviet Union, the sui generis state; (2) the East European satellites, which received the "word" from Soviet "armed missionaries"; and (3) Communist China, North Vietnam, and Cuba where Communist Parties came to power as a result of their own efforts. Another major distinction, easily discerned within the Communist world, is in the vast differences in industrialization and its concomitant national power of the states. The rate of philosophical ferment outside the porous Iron Curtain is bound to differ with the manifold degrees of industrialization and the state's needs for the ideology. With this caveat in mind it is still not a difficult task to find obviously common elements among the Communist states.

The "ideal type" to be delineated is that of a modern mass-industrialized quasi-totalitarian society. The syndrome of usually acknowledged traits of such societies includes a single disciplined mass party, run typically from the top by one man, a more or less terroristic police (although capricious and arbitrary terror have ceased to be a prime method of governance), a centrally directed and controlled economy, an exclusive possession of all means of effective mass communications, a monopoly of control of all means of effective armed combat, and a chiliastic ideology "consisting of an official body of doctrine covering all vital aspects of man's existence to which everyone living in that society is supposed to adhere, at least passively."[35]

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[35] Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), p. 19.

The "ideal type" Communist society possesses a highly developed, yet not mature, political culture because the legitimacy of the procedures for transferring political power is in dispute.[36] However, the civil institutions are inveterate establishments, public authorities are deep-rooted, and the hierarchical society has been welded into firm associations as its pluralism has increased. There is much political participation without political power. Political opposition is by definition anti-party, and no organized opposition is permitted either inside or outside the party. There is an apparent consensus that legitimacy resides in the ideological party. The government rejects any concept of the separation of powers or of checks and balances. Politics consists of the interplay of certain bureaucratic institutions which supposedly always have converging, if not identical, interests.

A Communist society is permeated with ideological orthodoxy. Following Marxist thought, it teaches that man is a good rational being who has been corrupted by evil institutions. "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence but, on the contrary, their existence which determines their consciousness."[37] Since man is regarded as the product of his social experience, it follows that he may be manipulated for his own good. The Marxist interpretation of human experience is one of continuing struggle over various interests--domestic, national, social, economic, and political--between exploiting classes and the proletariat, with all significant events being determined by economic forces. This monistic view stresses the ubiquity of conflict and the constant repetition of thesis, antithesis,

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[36] Finer, op. cit., pp. 90-92.

[37] Karl Marx, quoted in Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, pp. 125-26.

and synthesis; even so, the predetermined course of history to the Marxist is an upward progression. The state, until it "withers away," will always be the instrument of dominion, the domination of one class over another. This is the visionary Communist conception of a monolithic one-world.

The Communist Party as "vanguard of the proletariat" must be all powerful; this power receives ideological reinforcement as ideology fosters an insatiable lust for power, especially economic power, as a value in itself. This power is essential because the Communist state is in a perpetual condition of animosity with capitalist states.

The concrete expression of the ideology is the regime's absorption with advancing productive accomplishment at home and the nurturing of continued Communist revolution abroad. Ideology functions primarily as a buttress for upholding the vision of political developments, i.e., as value structure, and secondarily as a propagandist instrument to conceal reality.

C. The Developing Nation Model

> National development is a total phenomenon . . . involving industrialization, classes, values, economic and political organization, bureaucracy, ideology systems, and international relations.[38]

The so-called developing nations represent a wide continuum, with varying problems occurring at each progression along the path to self-sustained growth and industrial and political development. Since each particular nation is, in many respects, unique, individual prognoses would have to be based on an analysis of the localized operative forces. Nevertheless throughout these regions there exist conspicuous analogy and common attributes. Where there is a power vacuum, both ideology and power are of crucial importance

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[38]Silvert, op. cit., Introduction, p. 32.

to the internal dynamics of development.

By definition, developing nations have had to endure extreme hardship and suffering merely to attain enough power to satisfy their most urgent needs. They are deeply suspicious of superior power for good historical reasons. Most of the developing nations are in transition from a predominantly traditional colonial heritage. Their major problems are centered around widespread hunger, poverty, illiteracy, and unending economic crisis. They are desperately trying to mobilize properly the investment capital, the human skills, and the natural resources to sustain an increase in the productivity of their people. They also are seeking, amid a multiplicity of contemporary circumstances, effective political institutions appropriate to life in the mid-twentieth century. "Politics almost invariably tends to be crude, either nakedly authoritarian or noisily but somewhat ineffectively revolutionary."[39] If there is a generic political style it may best be portrayed as a "fluctuating oligarchy" in that political power may be held by varying groups of politicians, bureaucrats, and military officers. Any ascendant group or party may customarily be coupled with and muster its support from a charismatic or at least enterprising leader. Usually these leaders have gleaned their popularity, not for the position they represent, but for what they have fought against. "The political party structure also is almost always under great strain, driven by a growing social need for impersonalism and hampered by the continuing importance of charisma."[40]

The material preconditions for the development of cohesive civil associations are deficient; public adherence to the existing political institutions is not substantial due to a sense of frustration and impatience with

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[39] Ibid., p. 34.

[40] Ibid., p. 35.

earlier political processes. These factors, combined with a regime that may often be thoroughly discredited, leave legitimacy a highly contestable matter.

The thrust toward a new ideology is a prime political fact in the developing nations. Their political beliefs and ideas, though appearing in a host of interesting variations, are nevertheless similar in their "theoretical content and practical application"; they may be subsumed under the heading of "modernizing nationalism."[41] This ideological hybrid is a combination of nationalism and socialism; one is meaningless without the other.

The nationalist side of the coin is a collective admonition of independence and nonalignment in international affairs, a defensive reaction directed against any encroachments of the world powers. Its predominant motivating force is the desire for increased national status and dignity on the world scene. Although most nations do not strenuously oppose Communism nor accept the notion that it is something evil in itself,[42] their ideology does have a nationalist cutting edge against Communist interference.

The other side, socialism, is directed against the wealthy capitalist nations; its driving force is the desire for economic development. It proclaims that developing nations want little or nothing to do with free enterprise capitalism because of its proverbial infamous concomitant imperialism. This does not, however, exclude covert dealings with

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[41]Paul E. Sigmund, Jr. (ed.). The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 3-5.

[42]John G. Stoessinger, The Might of Nations (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 202.

capitalist nations;[43] politicians realize that foreign capital and other external assistance is of critical importance for developing their countries. This, of course, cannot be proclaimed as part of an ideological program.

As in the case of Communism, the ideology of "modernizing nationalism," with its emphasis on unity and solidarity, may be particularly useful in decreasing the power of internal political opposition. Ideological justification lends legitimacy to politically motivated acts. The negative aspects of the ideology, those stressing nationalism, are useful in diverting attention from other embarrassing problems, and may also increase the will of the people to endure continued sacrifices and dislocations. In sum, ideology is a tension-managing device to ease the "growing pains" of developing nations.

We must now apply these models to the real world.

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[43] Silvert, op. cit., p. 35. "Although the ideological content is usually still strongly anti-imperialist in practice, the new security and the necessity for external markets tend to soften xenophobia."

IV. Situational Aspects

The roles of ideology and power make little sense without defining the world political situation. Politics is molded by global events; foreign policy, the expression of politics, is a response to these events. To be relevant this essay must emphasize the hard realities of the modern world; political reality consists, for purposes of empirical analysis, of power struggles at two levels of intensity. At the upper level, the struggle engages colossi of power which either through exigency or through intent reach out to influence others. At the lower level, the struggle is for men's minds; the virility and catholicity of Communism and liberal democracy are at stake.

This section will center on the foreign policies of the <u>essential</u> national actors, the United States and the Soviet Union, plus an aspirant to essentiality, Communist China. A collective entity, the developing nations, has also been included because these areas are the battlefields of our times. We shall try to find regularities in the behavior of these nations for purposes of subsequent generalizations.

In the second half of the twentieth century almost every major international crisis[44] has been spawned out of the dynamic process of social mobilization occurring in the developing nations where more than a billion human beings are involved in revolutionary movements designed to modernize their societies. In each case--Vietnam (or Indochina), Suez, Lebanon, Cuba, the Congo, Malaysia, Tibet, and so on--Communist and Western foreign policies have interacted with policies of the modernizing nationalists. Given the situation of political and ideological antagonism among the major powers, and given the existence of these areas of powerlessness, the

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[44]Berlin is a notable exception.

foreign policy of a great power must necessarily be concerned over what others are doing in the area. My thesis is basically this: Ideology has not been a major reason for these crises; it has played only an indirect role.

A. Foreign Policies of the Developing Nations

At a time when the thrust toward ideological thinking is becoming exhausted in the industrialized world, new ideologies, directly correlated with gaining social, political, and economic power in the shortest possible time span, are being fashioned and accepted with fervor in the developing world. Their importance in this crucial struggle for power was stressed earlier from a domestic vantage point. We will now investigate the predominant foreign policy actions of the third world to discover the dynamics involved and their relationship to power and ideology.

Developing nations, understandably concerned lest the Cold War prove uncontrollable, have shown in the United Nations and elsewhere that they are not indifferent to the world struggle. Furthermore, they have exhibited no particular diffidence in airing their views on all aspects of world affairs. The typical modernizing nationalist sentiment, rejecting the ideologies of both East and West, has been expressed below by Tom Mboya, Kenya's minister for economic planning and development. Repudiating former colonial powers' attempts to manipulate his policies,[45] he sounded a warning also against the threat of Communism to African freedom, saying:

> Merely because Eastern countries have never had a colony in Africa, this doesn't mean they have no cold war designs upon Africa. We have made it clear we reject the ideology of

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[45] Tom Mboya, "Mboya's Warning on Communism," San Francisco Chronicle, April 13, 1965, p. 5.

> communism. It is just not good enough for some people to go around pretending everything from the East is for the good of Africa and everyone from the East means well for Africa.[46]

He also admonished Communist states lest they ". . . be tempted to impose economic colonialism or neo-colonialism . . ." and called on African party leaders to pursue a course of genuine nonalignment.[47]

The ideology of "modernizing nationalism" sustains its peoples during the long travail necessary in the metamorphic process from backward lands to mighty nations. And, like most ideologies, it glorifies the attributes and minimizes the faults of its own followers, while placing the burden of blame for lack of fulfillment or slow progress on outside elements. Especially does it tend to be moralistic toward what are perceived to be "power plays" by the dominant nations. Yet it does not cast out the mote in its own eye. Moralistic sentiments give way when underdeveloped nations adopt policies of hegemony or territorial expansion. India and/or Pakistan, Indonesia, and others, all engage in the same power politics about which their ideologies accuse and discredit the established nations.

The bereft nations use their minimal power to further their national interests in the international realm through the processes of the United Nations and by taking advantage of great power rivalry. These two important "strategies" are often used in combination and are mutually supportable.

Sydney Bailey has remarked that "it is not surprising that they should place their hopes in the United Nations, which seeks to minimize the role of national military power and that they should use the Organization to promote the advancement of the needy parts of the world."[48] Making the

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[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Sydney Bailey, The United Nations: A Short Political Guide (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 19.

United Nations a debating society rather than an action agency for peace has been one avenue of this effective promotion.[49] As a body the Afro-Asian Group, constituting a majority of the membership, often controls the vote in the General Assembly. Though not always in harmony, they have consistently acted in concert on questions concerning the rapid dismantling of the remaining vestiges of colonialism, and the arranging of large-scale United Nations aid to the less developed parts of the world.[50] The United Nations has become a medium in which aggregates of strength can be constructed by the weaker nations so that they can go far to compensate the political dominance of stronger states.

One reason the major powers have acquiesced thus far is that they are attempting to recruit supporters everywhere. The United States, the Soviet Union, Communist China, and other nations to a lesser degree, have used foreign aid and technical assistance to exert influence wherever they could, steadily intensifying the East-West and Sino-Soviet competitions for the favor of neutralist states. The emerging nations, in return, have conducted themselves so as to advance their own causes, often wooing one side, then the other, inducing the powers to grant them the greatest possible amount of aid and assistance.

Some United States Congressmen have complained publicly that the most U.S. foreign aid goes to those needy countries with the most Communists. The implication is that it seems to benefit a country to keep

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[49] Harlan Cleveland, "The Evolution of Rising Responsibility," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LII, No. 1332, January 4, 1965, p. 11.

[50] Bailey, op. cit., pp. 47-48.

its Communist threat for its cash value, an alleged menace being easily redeemable in U.S. support. This paradox of power serves to enforce Thomas Schelling's insightful proposition that ". . . in bargaining, weakness may be strength."[51]

These opportunistic actions constitute a novel form of power politics, possible only in an age where great-power rivalry and a military balance of terror, inhibiting somewhat the great-power use of force, present the small powers with more freedom of action. Their "blackmail of weakness" allows them to promote their own interest and to enjoy an eminence which their actual power does not justify. Whether this paradox can long survive is a problem far afield from this discussion. However, the dominance of national interest (power) considerations over ideological ones is unmistakable.

B. Soviet Foreign Policy

Does the Soviet Union follow foreign policies formulated in the traditional great power manner of realistic appraisal of individual situations according to its national interests, or does it adhere strictly to dogmatic ideological beliefs? The most common answer to this relevant question is that it follows an indeterminate combination of the two. While adhering in general to this answer, the hypothesis posited here is that ideology plays its role primarily in undertakings at a level characterized by limited commitment, meager risk, and a disposition (though usually masked) either to come to terms or to concede to superior power. It is these ventures into "targets of opportunity" which have kept American policy-makers extremely preoccupied.

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[51] Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 52.

By Marxist-Leninist definition, Communist expansion into an area is not imperialist expansion; rather, today's Communist guerrillas, like Stalin's troops before them, enter countries to shake off the rule of iniquitous, historically condemned, no longer viable, political institutions. The Soviet Union has this "political formula" available which equates expansion with liberation, the Communist Party with the working class (the essential population). To this extent then they are an ideological power: they are a national power with an ideology that can be put into effect when opportunity arises.

The economically advanced countries are too virile and vigorous and prosperous for the Communists to seize by force or subversion. Therefore, the Russians are addressing themselves to the less developed countries to heighten the frustrations, complexities, and crosscurrents inherent in the transition to modernization. According to Walt Rostow, their tactics are based on a judgment that, "unless communism manages to seize power during the complex and difficult transition to modernization, a Communist takeover will prove impossible."[52] The ideological belief is that a successful Communist revolution must generally precede economic and social development. The now fashionable practice of intervention by nations in the internal politics of other nations fits ideally into the Soviet pattern of opportunism. One of their favorite methods is to encourage exaggerated nationalism where it serves their interests, as in Indonesia. Where there is disruptive conflict, Communists acquire "presence, influence, and leverage."[53]

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[52] W. W. Rostow, "The Role of Emerging Nations in World Politics," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LII, No. 1845, April 5, 1965, p. 494.

[53] Ibid., p. 493.

The roles played in the Greek civil war, the Korean War, the Middle East, the civil war in Laos, the Congo, Cyprus, Cuba, Guinea, and now Vietnam have been opportunistic, of relatively modest effort and low priority, and planned in the hope of attaining profitable bonuses. When such plans go awry, the Soviets salvage what they can, and abandon ship.[54]

Lest the Soviets are given more credit than they deserve, it must be emphasized that they choose their targets carefully. Their policy is not directly expansive; it embodies pragmatic exploitation of tensions. The opportunity for subversion is provided because of a previous lack of corrective action in the society concerned. The real enemy, more often than not, may be a corrupt non-Communist regime, for instance that of Batista, Farouk, Diem, and ad nauseum. Communist ideology plays only an indirect role and is not the reason for arising crises. The reasons already exist.

> The fact that danger crosses a frontier should cause us to look at the conditions which attract the infiltrator in the first place, which make him choose this country rather than another as his target.[55]

The Cuban revolution came first and then the Cuban Communism!

Although the Marxist doctrine falsely contends that Communism is able to control environment, it has not been primarily the Soviet ideology that has caused them to capitalize on the trouble spots of the world, but an especial Soviet perception of, and sensitivity to, changing conditions within unfulfilled areas, that makes them ripe for Communism.

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[54]Charles O. Lerche, Jr., "What's Behind the Russian Mask?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 89, No. 9, September 1963, p. 30. I am indebted to Lerche for the theory that Soviet foreign policy is operative at three distinct levels of intensity--real security, prestige, and opportunism. However, he denies the significance of ideology at all three levels.

[55]Thomas L. Hughes, "Making the World Safe for Diversity," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LI, No. 1306, July 6, 1964, p. 14.

Soviet foreign policy, like that of most states, is based primarily on this sensitivity to environmental change. This means that it can be analyzed in reactive terms rather than with reference to the well-advertised provocative blueprint for world conquest. The ideological blueprint exists, but it may be considered almost irrelevant if Soviets act according to their situational analyses, using the blueprint merely to justify the use of force.

> Today the Realpolitik of the Russians, whatever their ideological proclamations, appears to be addressed as much to stabilization as to conquest. . . . The menace of Russia under the Communists has come to seem rather like the menace of Russia under the czars--which is to say that it has come to seem a normal, rather than an extraordinary, menace.[56]

The Kremlin foreign policy has operated, and is operating today, simultaneously at several different levels of priority judgment. Top priority moves, commonly enough, are almost invariabley involved with defense at all costs of the self-perceived immediate security of the Soviet Union, especially along its Western frontier. Threats to this security, whether real or imagined, have been dealt with in a very hostile manner and under a decided burden of risk.[57] When the Russians intervened in Hungary in 1956, they acted almost solely in terms of the national interest, suppressing the Hungarian uprising without fretting over consequences elsewhere. Acutely aware of the Hungarian desire for national independence from Soviet occupation, the Russians intervened essentially not to save Marxism-Leninism--their ideological justification for the intervention--but to preserve their super-empire. Ideology, of course, does set the national interest.

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[56] Louis j. Halle, "National Policy and Real Policy" in Howard R. Swearer and Richard P. Longaker (eds.), Contemporary Communism: Theory and Practice (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1963), p. 226.

[57] Cf. Robert Strausz-Hupe, "Protracted Conflict" in Swearer and Longaker, op. cit., p. 223. "The slightest trespass of the Communist frontier is deemed fraught with the risk of all-out war."

The various Berlin crises--the blockade of 1948, the Wall affair of 1961, and the latest harassment of air and highway traffic into the city during the German Federal Republic parliamentary meetings there, point up the Soviet fear of a rising powerful non-Communist German state. Of almost equal intensity, however, have been the U-2 crisis in 1960 and the border disputes with its growing Asian rival--Communist China. These crises have in common, besides a high risk-level, the threat to the national security of the Soviet Union.[58] The Kremlin, not unjustifiably, is worried over the emergence of nuclear-armed powers on two frontiers. This can hardly be traced to ideological motivations.

The intermediate plane of Soviet action is less easily discernible and is reserved for the bulk of direct encounters with the United States, for conduct in the United Nations, and for policy with Red China. Obviously, many Soviet policies are below the security threat crisis level, but are of greater intensity than mere opportunism. It is apparent that there is no serious hope of expansion in the United States, but the Soviet Union, as one of the two dominant powers, is motivated strongly in its competition with the U.S. Like Avis Rent-a-Car, "they are only second best, so they must try harder." This contest is for prestige and world leadership, for the recognition that is their due as a global power.[59] And a similar feeling exists toward Red China, as the "status seekers" vie for Communist jurisdiction. The competition imposes upon the Soviet Union a new need to demonstrate to censorious Communist audiences that the Soviet Union is not negligent in its revolutionary duty.

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[58] Lerche, op. cit., p. 29.

[59] Ibid., p. 31.

We might also consider their reaction toward the United Nations. The Soviets are not particularly interested in the United Nations, which to them is just a world forum; small-state influence is out of all proportion with their importance or their contributions. This, in part, accounts for Soviet refusal to pay dues for certain operations of the UN, for the refusal to be bound by majority decision in the UN, and for the frequent use of the veto to protect its position. Soviets also "claim that all peacekeeping matters should be handled solely in the Security Council."[60]

As we have shown, the Soviets have an extremely strongly developed sense of the decisive role of power. They play often on the instrument of power in international politics, but at three distinct pitches--the high pitch of national security, the medium range of "status seekers," and the low intensity of ideological opportunism. The essence of this fact is the intimate fusion of two things: a sense of power against a background of an ideological belief system which sustains the power.

C. Chinese Communist Foreign Policy

Turning to the aspiring giant Red China, we see that its performance on the instrument of power has an overriding effect of primitive percussion, instead of the sensitivity and adroitness of the Russian Communists. China has neither the range of power nor the foreign policy skill of the Soviet Union. The essential difference between the two is that bereft China is more ideologically driven than affluent Russia; and such motivation generates a cruder, more fanatic foreign policy. A lack of worldly necessities should logically indicate a materialist Chinese regime. However, like the developing nations, China uses its ideology to mobilize its people for progress

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[60]Cleveland, op. cit., p. 11.

and sustain them in the deficiency of possessions and subsistence. Chinese Communism is a domestic product, drawing its vitality from a Maoistic interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. Used as an intellectual frame of reference, the dogmatic core to which all thoughts and actions can be referred, Chinese ideology is characterized by its "mass line" and such concomitant slogans as "great leap forward," "thought reform," and "the spiritual A-bomb is more important than a material one."

The degree of absurdity to which ideology has penetrated Chinese society can best be understood by a recount of why Chinese players did so well in the recent World Ping-pong Championships. According to a Peking broadcast, Chinese table tennis players achieved the ping-pong victories by "studying and holding high the great Red Banner of Mao Tze-tung's thought, laying emphasis on politics, and learning wholeheartedly from the Liberation Army"![61]

Such difference in intensities of ideology was not, however, the prime cause of the epochal Sino-Soviet split. The quarrel as it developed, according to Edward Crankshaw, was ". . . conducted in almost exclusively ideological terms; but it is apparent that issues other than purely ideological disputes are at stake."[62] There are familiar ideological differences easily discernible from phrases like "dogmatism" for criminal obscurantism, "revisionism" for betrayal of the revolution, and "fractionalism," the deadly sin of Communism.[63] However, even these supposedly major points of

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[61]"Coach Mao and His Paddlers," San Francisco Chronicle, April 26, 1965.

[62]Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War, Moscow v. Pekin (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 10.

[63]Ibid., p. 9.

dispute cannot explain adequately the range and bitterness of the verbal battle. Other major issues involved are also explained by Crankshaw:

> Between the Soviet Union and China there is a straightforward conflict of power and prestige as between two great powers bordering each other and growing mightily. . . . The ideological differences are bound up with these basic facts, and, even if Moscow and Peking could reach apparent ideological compromise, the movement would still be split.[64]

In this conflict ideology is not the end, but the means; it is being used by Russia and China as a weapon in the struggle. The struggle is almost assuredly one between two neighboring powers for self-assertion.

D. United States Foreign Policy

> The great moral of contemporary liberalism is that an ideology which cannot be translated into political action is pointless.[65]

No country is less isolationist than the United States. This is not caused by a desire for dominion, although the United States is certainly able to pursue power objectives, but by its role as leading power of the free world in a period of pervasive turmoil. The U.S. has undertaken in its foreign policy two broad tasks: (1) to provide "the major share of the defense of free-world interests" against Communist aggression; and (2) to furnish resources and technical assistance for the economic and political development of the emerging nations.[66]

These obligations require clear definition of foreign policy objectives and of the fundamental principles of action consistent with these

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[64] Ibid., p. 163.

[65] Adam B. Ulam, The Unfinished Revolution, An Essay on the Sources of Influence of Marxism and Communism (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 101.

[66] George Ball, "The Responsibilities of a Global Power," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LI, No. 1319, October 5, 1964, p. 475.

goals. A serious dilemma confronts any nation which must reconcile the demands for national security under the exigent conditions of the Cold War with the basic ideals of a liberal democratic state. The growing dependence upon its massive military strength places special responsibility upon the U.S. to handle this power with the utmost care and restraint, never losing sight of the fact that military power is only a means to an end, never an end in itself. Liberal principles prescribe that power and wars be eliminated by universal observance of simple rules such as "non-intervention" and "respect for sovereignty."[67] Accordingly, the only valid reason for the use of violence is to put down violence.

(1) Crisis Management

For the three decades preceding this week there had been no invasion or overt intervention in Latin America by U.S. Marines. The landing at Santo Domingo on April 28, 1965, was undoubtedly dictated by reasons vital to our political interests, but it signified the obvious delimitation of the liberal ideology as a fundamental guide to our foreign policy. In essence, a direct military invasion is being practiced for political ends in contradiction to an ideology with which we have identified ourselves, thus indicating that extreme liberalism in foreign affairs is logically untenable. Since the prime adversaries of the U.S. have implacably revolutionary purposes of encompassing the world, America cannot turn away from basic issues just because they involve conflict with liberal principles. Rather, the U.S. compromises between the desirability and the feasibility of various alternatives.

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[67]Huntington, op. cit., pp. 148-153.

For example, the orthodox liberal argument, applied to the apparently endemic civil wars now in fashion, decrees refraining from intervening and recognizing "fair play" even if it is against our interests. This moral-legal position uses the principle of sovereignty without considering the outcome, but political theory condemns as a distortion of reality the moralist absolute that violence is evil under all historical circumstances. Indeterminate political situations, unclear circumstances, and instances of friction initiated in response to internal conditions do exist that lead to a violent discharge; our Declaration of Independence may serve as a reminder. Often the problem of assigning responsibility is an impossible one. The opponents may both be right or both wrong, rather than always "right" versus "wrong." There may be valid and sufficient reasons why a peaceful solution cannot be reached.

Since many moralist critics make no allowance for the pursuit of national interest, even for defense of our allies, the doctrine of non-intervention is contrary to reason and cannot be maintained as a general rule. The interests of several countries may be affected by a civil war. Intervention, as extra-legal action that is not always dependent on "right," becomes a possibility whenever there is war. We "paint ourselves into a traditional corner" when we use American strength only in response to another's aggression.

Another example of the contradictions imposed on the policy-maker by liberal principles flows from the partitioning of Korea, Germany, and Vietnam. In accordance with liberal tenets, the zones were originally intended as condominiums to be unified at some later date by nonviolent means. Under opposing ideologies it is virtually impossible to unify these

countries by peaceful means, and whoever fires the first shot must be labeled an aggressor. In order to intervene in protection of national interest the United States must treat one partition as a sovereign nation and construct the situation so that we are always reacting to aggression.

Often it is no easier to reconcile our national interest with our foreign policy than it is to reconcile our ideology with our actions. Much ambiguity surrounds the actual definitions of our interest. For example, our national interest calls for no extension of Communist dominion. Contrary to this interest, Tibet was annexed by China. We "sat on our hands." The Chinese speed of action--a fait accompli, tremendous potential cost of life by American interference, a Tibet far removed from our "sphere of influence," and other such considerations were all factors overriding American intervention in behalf of its own interest and in the face of an aggressive act abhorred by liberal principles. Intervention probably did not even receive serious consideration in Washington.

(2) Foreign Aid

Ideology is more compatible with the second task of our foreign policy--furnishing aid to the developing world. The motivations for helping these areas are mixed, but national interest is again dominant. On the one hand, because of ideological (read moral) reasons Americans would want to help these peoples progress even if there were no such thing as Communism. Liberalism is concerned with equality of economic and political opportunity and freedom from control. But there is another reason, echoed here by Secretary of State Rusk: "Our security is inextricably bound up with the evolution of a world of independent peace-seeking nations."[68] There

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[68]Dean Rusk, "The Pursuit of Peace," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LI, No. 1312, August 17, 1964, p. 482.

cannot be stability in a world composed of a few who are rich and many who are poor. In light of the global ideological and power struggle and the fact that both major branches of the Communist world are concentrating their efforts in the less developed areas, it is urgent that the United States assist them in gaining a more abundant life so that they do not lose their freedom.

Has this analysis of liberalism and the use of power in U.S. foreign policy, undertaken in the harsh light of reality, uncovered a betrayal of our liberal tradition and revealed a power-oriented America? Such a point of departure has been purposely taken to disclose the impossibility of using undiluted liberal principles in the conduct of foreign policy. Decision-makers at the highest levels of our government must be able to react with appropriate strength, resolve, and restraint in handling global crises, if the demands of national security are to be adequately fulfilled. The American system operates through bargaining and compromise; ideology creates difficulties in responding to change, and undermines power. However, in actual American foreign policy, power dilutes ideology. President Lyndon B. Johnson, in his April 7, 1965, address to the peoples of the world and the nation, justified the use of power in terms of American ideology:

> We fight because we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny . . . the infirmities of man are such that force must often precede reason . . . our resources are equal to any challenge--because we fight for values and a principle, rather than territories or colonies, our patience and determination are unending. . . . We dream of a world where disputes are settled by law and reason. And we will try to make it so. . . . I do not find . . . [power] . . . impressive. The guns and bombs, the rockets and warships, are all symbols of human failure. They are necessary symbols. They protect what we cherish. But they are witness to human folly.[69]

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[69]"The President's Address," San Francisco Chronicle, April 8, 1965, p. 18.

It is assuredly American ideology as we have defined it that has conditioned the U.S. style of leadership. U.S. leaders adopt a slightly Machiavellian attitude of applying ideology whenever and wherever they can in the conduct of foreign policy, giving precedence to power when the two cannot coexist compatibly.

E. The "Delicate Balance of Terror"[70]

We might now apply this analysis of the roles of ideology and power in United States and Soviet foreign policy to the awesome nuclear destructiveness that continues to haunt international politics. Less than three years ago the world was exposed in the Cuban missile crisis to the ominous threat of a direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although for the time being this threat seems to have dissipated--there is an unmistakable movement away from a bipolar confrontation of the two superpowers--[71] it has by no means been laid to rest.

How do ideology and power interact in the "balance of terror"? The Cuban crisis will serve as our example.

At first glance it would appear that power was the determining factor in the outcome of this crisis. Both sides had destructive strength approaching infinity. Yet Khrushchev gave way! In such a finely balanced circumstance, the aspects to consider are the specific situation, the roles played by the opposing nations, and the evident will and resolve of the peoples involved.

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[70]Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign Affairs (January, 1959), p. 211.

[71]Hughes, op. cit., p. 7.

> During any period in which the opposing powers have the capability of causing what approaches unacceptable damage, regardless of which one strikes first, military power becomes of secondary importance to the demonstration of the will necessary to exercise the power.[72]

What determines the will of the people? It is conditioned, as we have previously noted, by ideology--but Khrushchev gave way! What does this indicate?

In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union was employing its typical low intensity ideological opportunism, while the U.S. was faced with an immediate national security threat. Our national interest, indeed our very way of life, was at stake, determining our fierce resolve. The Soviet Union, who would not risk suicide protecting the short-term goal of aggression, could retreat with mere loss of prestige. The United States had the advantage of credibility in this "clash of wills."

We might conclude then that its national interest and the estimate of U.S. will were overriding in the Soviet decision to remove the missiles, whereas the national security threat and value structure were paramount in the U.S. determination to resist aggression with unlimited destructive power if necessary. This illustration serves to demonstrate that the balance of terror is a precarious one, dependent more on complex analysis of individual situational aspects and the disposition of the adversaries than on clear-cut lines of ideology and power.

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[72] Richard C. Bowman, "National Policy in the War of Wills," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 91, No. 4, Whole No. 746, April, 1965, p. 4g.

V. Conclusions

The underlying assumption of this essay, as implied throughout, is that ideology and power cannot be usefully studied outside the context of the social and political reality within which they are rooted. With this in mind we first defined the nature of the terms and discussed their relationship to each other. We then analyzed their role in three disparate societal models, emphasizing their compatibility or lack thereof with the central characteristics of the three political systems, i.e., the extent political formulae. Finally, we examined the foreign policies of selected states to determine the roles of ideology and power as viewed in the confusing light of contemporary turmoil. These numerous perspectives--foreign and domestic, liberal and totalitarian, modern and traditional, industrialized and underdeveloped, and so on--have enabled us to draw conclusions at each stage of the essay concerning the importance of ideology and power. It now remains to assimilate this previous information.

The degree of modernization and industrialization of a society has been posited as being a major determinant of the character of its domestic politics and hence of the ideology within the society. Basically, ideology provides the adhesive for binding groups in the society to common goals and paths of action. In the early transitional periods of mobilization, those requiring extreme human sacrifice, the ideology does this by functioning primarily as a tension-managing device, for example, demanding hatred of "capitalist imperialists" as an indispensable social vinculum.

When the society has progressed through the upper transitional stages of political and economic development toward modernity, the ideology functions less in managing tension and more as a value structure, as it is now doing in liberal democracies and in the more industrialized Communist states. Domestically then, ideological fervor should continue to decrease in our more modern societies as vertical mobility causes uncertainty and skepticism of ideological claims. Speculation about the future turn of ideology in the developing nations may be premature; however, it will increasingly reflect the growth of welfare demands along with demands for equality and human rights. Racist overtones may reasonably be expected to increase ideological fervor in many developing nations.

Although the impact of ideology is visible and important in the field of foreign affairs, the pendulum has been swinging away from world ideological struggles to the realities of power. Cold war tensions are not primarily ideological or even psychological, but result from real "clashes of interest" stemming from the simple idea of territorial expansion by one great power into the "sphere of influence" of another great power. The role of ideology is only an indirect one.

Few issues at stake in the contemporary world can be formulated, intellectually, in ideological terms. An ideological approach, rooted in systemic values, may be deterministic, one-dimensional, and not conducive to an atmosphere of compromise. However, for the policy-maker, the calculations of relative power and national interests may likewise prove deficient. This infinitely flexible realist approach also depends on a value system, one which tends to downgrade or ignore too many aspects of the actual relations of states, particularly factors of human will, to be

a reliable guide. Computations of relative power and estimates of national interest may indeed lead to unwarranted optimism that will inevitably be shattered by the realities of today's crises in such places as Vietnam. A synthesis appears to be in order.

What peace exists in the world today appears to be based more on fear than on friendship. As we have reiterated, our societies are undergoing extended, accelerated, and, in some cases, violent change. This process of change, not ideology or even power, is the central and ordering (or, more commonly, disordering) concept of world politics.

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